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 MARXIST AND SOVIET 
LAW
stephen c. thaman
i. The Marxist Critique of Law Before 
the Russian Revolution
. What is “Marxism”?
“Marxism” as a political, sociological, economic, and philosophical school of 
thought and action originally developed from the works of Karl Marx (1818–1883) 
and Friedrich Engels (1820–1895), two German thinkers who, in their individual 
and co-authored writings, provided a foundation for the nineteenth-century social-
ist movement. Broadly speaking, they propagated a theory of political economy 
based on the writings of Adam Smith (1723–1790), David Ricardo (1772–1823), and 
others which claimed that capitalism, while a necessary stage of world economic 
development, would eventually falter due to contradictions between the forces of 
economic production and the social relation engendered thereby. This crisis in 
production would lead to the working class or proletariat spearheading a revolu-
tionary movement to overthrow the capitalist mode of production and set up a 
transitional “dictatorship of the proletariat” which would eventually give way to a 
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utopian communist society where no state would be necessary and people would 
work according to their abilities and consume according to their needs.
2. The place of law in general, and criminal law  
in particular in the writings of Marx and Engels
Although Marx studied law (Engels was himself a capitalist who ran his family’s fac-
tories in England), the writings of Marx and Engels contain few insights into what 
the nature of law will be either in the transitional period of the “dictatorship of the 
proletariat” or in the future stateless communist society. Marx’s monumental work 
Das Kapital, however, describes in great detail the “laws” of capitalist commodity 
production based on the “exchange value” of commodities and their circulation and 
the accumulation of capital produced from the “surplus value” earned by the own-
ers of the means of production as a result of their exploitation of the labor power of 
the proletariat. With respect to the criminal law, one finds very few passages from 
Marx and Engels referring to criminal law, or what role it would play in a socialist 
or communist society.
a) The base–superstructure paradigm
Many Marxist commentators refer to comments by Marx and Engels which tend to 
show that the forces and relations of production of society constitutes its “base” or 
infrastructure, and that it is this base which ultimately determines the “superstruc-
ture” of society, that is, the particular state or social institutions that arise, as well as 
political theories, ideologies, art and culture, etc. While mainstream Marxists saw 
the state itself as being part of the superstructure, and a mere reflection of the forces 
and relations of production of the given socioeconomic system, if not an institution 
designed to defend and perpetrate them, more critical voices insisted that the writ-
ings of Marx and Engels were not clear, and that some of their texts tended to show 
that the state was itself part of the “relations of production,” and thus the “base.”
b) The doctrine of the “withering away” of the state under communism
In key writings, Marx and Engels do talk about the fact that the nation-state, which 
had become the protector of the foundations of the capitalist system of produc-
tion, would gradually “wither away” in the transition from the dictatorship of the 
proletariat to a fully developed communist society, though they also talk, in various 
writings, about the fact that “bourgeois law,” that is, the law which mirrored the 
development of private property and capitalism, would still be necessary during the 
transitional dictatorship of the proletariat, because the state economy would still 
circulate commodities and labor based on “exchange value.”
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3. Law in the writings of Vladimir I. Lenin 
before the Russian Revolution
Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870–1924) was the founder and leader of the majority (in 
Russian, Bolshevik) faction of the Russian Democratic Labor Party and eventually 
led the coup d’état which, in November 1917, overthrew the interim government 
which had ruled Russia following the abdication of Tsar Nicholas II in February 
1917. Although Lenin was trained as a lawyer, he early became a professional revo-
lutionary and political theorist whose many writings drew on those of Marx and 
Engels.
His main treatise touching on law was State and Revolution which basically 
adopted the theory of the “withering away of the state” promoted by Marx and 
Engels as well as the notion that the transitional “dictatorship of the proletariat” 
would need to maintain “bourgeois” law until the final triumph of communism, 
when “law,” as such, would disappear with the state, and cede to mere “accounting 
and control.”
His main addition to Marxist thought would probably be his theory of the need 
for a revolutionary party to “guide” the workers and peasants, due to their inherent 
incapacity to do so themselves. The problem Russian Marxists had, in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries, was to square Marx’s theory, that socialism 
and communism would only be possible in a country with fully developed capital-
ism, with the idea of a socialist revolution in the predominantly peasant society of 
Russia which only had a fledgling proletariat in Moscow and St. Petersburg. One 
could say, thus, that Lenin propounded a theory of petty bourgeois revolution, 
where the non-productive but educated classes (lawyers, like Lenin, intellectuals, 
etc.) would take over the means of production from the incipient bourgeois class 
and land-owners with the help of the laboring classes.
4. Marxist approaches to criminal law 
before the Russian Revolution
Before the Russian Revolution in 1917, and the creation of the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics (USSR), which sought originally to base its rule in Marxism, 
there was little Marxist writing dedicated to law in general, or criminal law in 
particular.
An exception are the writings of Willem Bonger (1876–1940), a Dutch sociologist, 
whose 1905 dissertation “Criminality and Economic Conditions” was translated 
into English and published in 1916. Bonger argued that crime had two economic-
ally rooted sources: (a) need and deprivation suffered by the disadvantaged mem-
bers of society; and (b) greed and selfishness, which were the motivating factors of 
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capitalist society. He argued that moral relations and moral restraint are only pos-
sible in communities characterized by mutual interdependence and sympathetic 
identification, and that capitalism’s stress on competition and greed destroyed these 
values. They could only be restored in a future post-capitalist social system, where 
those who violate the law will do so only due to mental incapacity, and would be 
best treated by physicians, rather than punished.1
ii. The Development of Soviet 
Criminal Law Theory: Three Main 
Strains
1. Introduction
In the early years of Soviet rule, policy vacillated between minimalist, some-
times called “nihilist” criminal law echoing the utopian Marxist idea that the state 
and law would wither away, and the instrumental use of criminal law, first as a 
weapon against the class enemy to consolidate the “revolution,” the takeover by the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and, secondly, through the forced 
industrialization of the country.
Since Marx and Engels did not think socialism or communism could be estab-
lished in peasant countries like Russia or China, it is perhaps inevitable that Marxism 
would remain an ideology and would not have practical importance in creating 
post-revolutionary legal systems in those countries. Marxist-infused utopian notions 
of criminal law were trumpeted in the early periods of both regimes when the 
Communist parties were primarily interested in eliminating the remnants of the small 
incipient bourgeoisies or the rich peasants, that is, the classes that, according to Marx 
and Engels, were needed to create the economic basis for a transition to communism.
Because of this, the policies of the CPSU were in many respects objectively reac-
tionary and not revolutionary. For instance, Decree No. 1 on the Courts, issued in 
1917, eliminated the progressive reforms achieved by Tsar Alexander II, who had 
created a liberal legal system with an independent judiciary, independent prosecu-
tor, and adversary trial by jury in 1864, and eventually replaced them with a system 
of courts dependent on the CPSU in which party and government officials could 
call in the judgments they wanted the courts to return (“telephone law”).
1 Jeffrie G. Murphy, “Marxism and Retribution,” (1973) 2 Philosophy and Public Affairs 217, 234–243.
9780199673599_Hornle_Book.indb   298 10/28/2014   1:06:04 PM
marxist and soviet law   299
And especially under the rule of Joseph V. Stalin (1878–1953), the CPSU rein-
troduced an economy based on forced labor which effectively reversed Alexander 
II’s abolition of serfdom in 1861. Stalin was a communist revolutionary from 
Georgia who won out in party struggles for control of the CPSU in the late 1920s 
and then ruled the USSR with an iron hand through World War II until his death 
in 1953.
“Marxist” utopianism, based on the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” quickly 
ceded to the instrumentalist use of criminal law by the CPSU in its dictatorship 
over the proletariat and peasantry which was aimed at forced industrialization and 
the collectivization of agriculture, which we can refer to as “Soviet” criminal law. 
However, “Soviet” law, to distinguish it from other totalitarian or authoritarian legal 
systems, did conserve some residue from its early “Marxist” roots.
I will now briefly discuss the three main trends in Soviet criminal law before 
elucidating how these three trends affected the General Part and the Special Part of 
Soviet criminal codes and overall Soviet criminal policy. These three main trends 
are: (a) “Marxist” radical utopian minimalism; (b) “enemy criminal law” aimed at 
consolidating the rule of the Communist Party; and (c) the mature “socialist rule 
of law” aimed at industrializing the Soviet state and educating the populace to be 
obedient to its policies.
2. “Marxist” radical utopian minimalism: the gradual 
withering away of criminal law
a) Introduction
After the end of the Russian Civil War, Lenin pushed what he called the “New 
Economic Policy” (NEP) which was, in a sense, a step backward from the radical 
expropriation of the capitalist classes begun in 1917, and was an implicit recogni-
tion of the fact that to rebuild the economy after the war, private enterprise was 
necessary. This “liberal” period of Soviet history began in 1922, continued beyond 
the death of Lenin in 1924, and constituted a period of great cultural productivity 
in painting, cinema, literature, and architecture, as well as in legal theory, with the 
writings of Pashukanis and others. It ended in the late 1920s as Stalin began to take 
over absolute control of the CPSU apparatus.
b) The general theory of law and Marxism by Yevgeniy Pashukanis
Yevgeniy B. Pashukanis (1891–1937), was the premier Soviet legal theoretician of 
the early USSR and his book The General Theory of Law and Marxism2 attempted 
2 Evgeny Pashukanis, “The General Theory of Law and Marxism,” in Piers Beirne and Robert 
Sharlett (eds.), Pashukanis: Selected Writings on Marxism and Law (1980), 40–131.
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to lay a Marxist philosophical and legal foundation for socialist law, and for its 
“withering away” along with the capitalist and post-capitalist state. He thus follows 
directly in the line of Marx, Engels, and Lenin. Just as Marx began Das Kapital with 
a treatise on the commodity, Pashukanis derives his theory of law from commodity 
exchange.
Commodity exchange and the replacement of use-value by exchange-value—that 
is, the quantification of things according to an abstract measure, money—enables 
humans to interact as “equals” and “individuals,” separated from their earlier collect-
ive life-world. Indeed, law in general, as we know it, arose to protect the relation-
ships between commodity owners and its language of rights and duties, both in the 
civil and criminal areas, and reflects these roots. “Only bourgeois-capitalist society 
creates all the conditions necessary for the legal element in social relationships to 
achieve its full realization.”3 Each human being became an abstract legal subject 
with rights and duties.
According to Pashukanis, the first appearance of criminal law comes with the 
stamp of commodity exchange, in the form of blood money, the tradition of pay-
ing the victim or the victim’s family a certain price to atone for the crime and pre-
vent blood revenge or feud. “A crime may be considered as a particular aspect of 
exchange, in which the exchange (contractual relationship) is established post fac-
tum, that is, after the intentional act of one of the parties. The ratio between the 
crime and the punishment is reduced to an exchange ratio.” The feud is transformed 
from a purely biological phenomenon into a legal institution to the extent that it is 
linked with the form of exchange-value.4
This state of affairs changed with the development of classes, when the ruling 
class sought to use the criminal law to prevail in its struggle with the lower and 
oppressed classes, where criminal law became a “method of merciless and harsh 
reprisal against ‘evil people’, ” that is, against “peasants who had fled from unbear-
able exploitation by landlords and the landlords” state, and against the pauperized 
population, vagrants, mendicants, etc. Punishment became a method of physical 
elimination or of instilling terror.5
Thus, when the institution of commodity exchange (and labor power is just 
another commodity) disappears, as a result of the communist revolution, so 
will bourgeois law and morality as we know it. They will be replaced in mature 
communism by a collective ethos epitomized by the phrase from Marx’s early 
works: “From each according to his capacities, to each according to his needs.” 
Criminal law, which had developed its basic characteristics of retribution and 
compensation from commodity exchange, would yield to administrative dis-
position of those few delinquents who challenged the harmony of a classless 
society.
3 Pashukanis (n. 2) 44. 4 Pashukanis (n. 2) 111–113. 5 Pashukanis (n. 2) 115.
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c) The chief tenets of “Marxist” utopian minimalism
The utopian Marxists thought that the future communist state could do without 
“law” or the “state” and were therefore very close to espousing an anarchist view. 
This “anti-criminal law” school held that there would be no crime under mature 
communism, because there would be no “need” among the masses and no avaristic 
ruling classes, thus eliminating the motivation for crime under capitalist relations 
of production.
But before that stage was reached, there could be no talk of “guilt” or “unlawful 
intent” in relation to violations committed by the laboring classes because they 
were not responsible for the system which created the need to commit the unlaw-
ful act. Therefore there could be no “punishment” but only the administration of 
protective “measures.” No criminal code would be needed, nor would the admin-
istrators of the system need a legal education. Judges, guided in their broad dis-
cretion only by “revolutionary consciousness,” would merely have to determine 
whether a “socially dangerous act” was committed and then decide what measures 
would be applied.
Mild administrative measures of re-education and social protection would be 
applied to errant proletarians and peasants, with the “punitive” repressive meas-
ures being reserved for those with evil intent—the capitalist, bourgeois class, and 
the surviving monarchists. Utopian Marxists rejected retribution as a goal of sanc-
tions, as it rejected the notion of punishment in its entirety. Special deterrence and 
re habilitation of the individual wrongdoer were their goals and measures which did 
not involve deprivation of liberty were therefore preferred.
In both China and Cuba the victorious revolutionaries also cancelled all the laws 
of the ancien régime and flirted with the utopian approach to criminal law in the 
revolution’s aftermath. The Cuban leader, Fidel Castro (b. 1926), for instance, main-
tained that the country needed no lawyers, and that all disputes would be handled 
informally claiming that “revolutionary justice is not based on legal precepts, but 
on moral convictions.”
3. Enemy criminal law: criminal law as a weapon 
against the class enemy
a) The notion of “enemy criminal law”
The expression “enemy criminal law” was coined by German professor Günther 
Jakobs,6 and refers to a type of criminal law that has existed since time immemorial. 
The notion is that there are two tracks of procedure and punishments: one for those 
6 Günther Jakobs, “Zur Theorie des Feindstrafrechts,” in Henning Rosenau and Sangyun Kim (eds.), 
Straftheorie und Strafgerechtigkeit (2010), 167–182.
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belonging to the dominant lineage, tribe, ethnicity, “citizens,” the “good guys” and 
another for the “other,” the outsiders, the “enemies” whether they were brigands, 
highwaymen, vagrants, or freed slaves, not to speak of the eternal American prob-
lem of having one system for the rich and another for the poor, one for the white 
and one for the black.
b) The chief tenets of “enemy criminal law” in the USSR
Soviet law, especially in the early years, reserved its harshest measures for use 
against the “class enemy,” the bourgeoisie or remaining monarchists, and later 
against whomever it determined was “anti-Soviet.” Already in State and Revolution, 
Lenin set the groundwork for the dual system characteristic of “enemy criminal 
law”: “The dictatorship of the proletariat produces a series of restrictions of liberty 
in the case of the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists. We must crush them 
in order to free humanity from wage slavery; their resistance must be broken 
by force; it is clear that where there is suppression there is also violence, there is 
not liberty, no democracy.” He asserted that the “State must be democratic for the 
proletariat and poor and dictatorial against the bourgeoisie.” According to Lenin: 
“the courts should not do away with terror—to promise that would be to deceive 
ourselves and others—but should give it foundation and legality, clearly, hon-
estly, without embellishments.” In § 27 of the 1922 Criminal Code a distinction 
was made between “crimes against the establishment of the worker and peasant’s 
power” and “all other crimes,” which led to sentencing aggravation for the com-
mission of the former.
Shortly before the Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Mao 
Zedong (1893–1976) took control of the Chinese mainland, Mao described the 
“people’s dictatorship” as “democracy for the people and dictatorship over the 
reactionaries.” The state was clearly seen as the “instrument by which one class 
oppresses another.”
In 1957, in his talk “On Correctly Handling Contradictions Among the People” 
Mao stated that: “all classes, strata and social groups that approved of, supported 
and participated in the endeavor to construct socialism fell under the rubric of the 
people, while all social forces and social groups that resisted the socialist revolution 
and were hostile to or undermined the construction of socialism, were the people’s 
enemies.” A member of the “people,” however, could become an “enemy” by com-
mitting a serious crime, such as murder, rape, or prostitution and become a “bad 
element.” Eventually, the class enemy was divided into the “five elements”:  land-
lords, rich peasants, counterrevolutionaries, bad elements, and “rightists.”
Soviet-style enemy criminal law is characterized by the use of a regular system of 
criminal courts for workers, peasants, and the “good guys” and either “revolution-
ary tribunals” or administrative organs of repression for the “enemy of the people.”
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Decree No. 1 on the Courts in 1917 established elected revolutionary tribunals 
with panels of six lay judges or assessors to deal with counterrevolutionary activ-
ity, thus marking the beginning of a separate system for the regime’s enemies. The 
revolutionary tribunals initially asked the public to help it decide cases. There was 
no prosecutor or defense counsel per se involved, other than citizens who could 
assume these roles. The courts had no laws, only their “revolutionary conscience” to 
guide them. No court personnel were professional jurists.
On November 21, 1917, the “Commission for the Fight Against the 
Counterrevolution” (CHEKA), was created to investigate cases for the revo-
lutionary tribunals, but it was later authorized summarily to execute “enemy 
agents, speculators, thugs, hooligans, counterrevolutionary agitators, and 
German spies” and to “destroy the bourgeoisie as a class.” Its only criteria was 
the class to which the suspect belonged, “his origins, education, training or pro-
fession.” It acted as investigative organ, court, and executioner until abolished 
in December 1921.
Under Stalin, the Unified State Legal Directorate (OGPU) and the People’s 
Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) set up tribunals that were instrumental 
in the Great Terror of the 1930s. The OGPU’s Special Board, established in 1924, 
was originally set up to facilitate campaigns against anti-Soviet elements and to 
silence potential opponents. They were later given the power to imprison or exile 
for a term of up to five years anyone considered to be “socially dangerous.” In the 
late 1930s, and again in the 1940s, the maximum sentence was extended to ten and 
then 25 years. Proceedings of the boards were not public, the accused had no right 
to counsel, and there was no appeal of verdicts. Most of the nearly 800,000 political 
prosecutions in 1937 were handled not by courts but directly by Special Boards or 
the notorious three-person panels (troiki).
Procedures for “enemies” were also carried out in a super-expedited fashion in 
the normal courts. For instance, Nikolay Krylenko (1885–1938), People’s Commissar 
for Justice from 1931 until shortly before his death, and a prominent utopian Marxist 
legal reformer, was tried and convicted in a 20-minute trial before the Military Panel 
of the Soviet Supreme Court and executed immediately after the trial.
China also set up its “People’s Tribunals” after 1950 which were to function as ad 
hoc courts to punish “local despots, bandits, special agents, counterrevolutionar-
ies, and criminals who violate the laws and orders pertaining to agrarian Reform.” 
These tribunals could make arrests, detain subjects, impose the death penalty, and 
other penalties. Mass trials, accusation meetings, and “big meetings to announce 
the sentence” were used to dispense justice. Each forum could involve up to tens of 
thousands of people.
In the early years, North Vietnam also used “special people’s courts” empowered 
to try counterrevolutionary elements, or anyone acting against agrarian reform and 
impose death penalties.
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After the 1959 revolution, Cuba introduced “revolutionary tribunals” to try mem-
bers of the previous regime for murder, torture, and other atrocities, but their juris-
diction was eventually extended to the crimes of alleged insurgents. Marked by 
summary procedures and the power to impose capital punishment, these courts were 
staffed by a mixed bench of professional and lay judges, with the latter composed of 
soldiers, civilian militia members, and representatives from the Ministry of Interior.
Cuba also continues to use special “summary proceedings” in the trials of dis-
sidents and those charged with crimes threatening state security. These trials are 
closed to the public, take place days after arrest and pursuant to exceedingly lax 
evidentiary rules with a limited right to counsel. They always result in conviction.
The overwhelming penal theory behind “enemy criminal law” is a combination 
of special deterrence (the commitment to a concentration camp or immediate exe-
cution) with general deterrence:  the reign of terror and Stalin’s show trials were 
definitely designed to induce obedience in the general population.
4. Establishment of the “socialist rule of law” 
under the reign of Joseph V. Stalin
By the time Stalin had consolidated his power and proclaimed that socialism could 
be created in one country, without waiting for the victory of socialist revolutions in 
the more developed countries of Western Europe, the utopian theory of the “with-
ering away” of the state propounded by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Pashukanis was 
rejected in favor of the idea of a “socialist rule of law.”
The main proponent of this new legal ideology was Andrey Vyshinskiy (1883–
1954). He held the positions of Minister of Justice, Prosecutor General of the USSR, 
and, in the end, was a diplomat involved in the negotiations surrounding the found-
ing of the United Nations. He was also the chief prosecutor in many of the most 
prominent “show trials,” including that of Pashukanis.
Vyshinskiy wrote: “Over the course of years an almost monopolistic position in 
legal science has been enjoyed by a group of persons who have turned out to be 
provocateurs and traitors—people who actually knew how to contrive the work 
of betraying our science, our state and our fatherland under the mask of defend-
ing Marxism-Leninism.” He denounced the “Trotsky–Bukharin band headed by 
Pashukanis, Krylenko, and a number of other traitors.”
The “socialist state” was now semi-permanent and its ruling clique, the 
Communist Party, needed its own “rule of law” for its state, much as the capital-
ist classes supposedly used the “bourgeois” state to maintain its economic and 
political hegemony.
This new “socialist law” required socialist legal education and legally trained 
judges, prosecutors, and criminal investigators, instead of amateurs inspired by 
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“revolutionary consciousness.” It required criminal codes and criminal punishment. 
Special prevention gradually took a backseat to retribution and general deterrence. 
Parole was eliminated in 1938.
Once Stalin and his successors accepted that their socialist rule of law was not 
transitory, and had to be administered by professionals, the unsuccessful prosecu-
tions which ended in dismissals or acquittals due to the incompetence of the ama-
teur officials became unacceptable. Acquittals were considered to be a blemish on 
the system and virtually disappeared.7
Indeed, the emphasis on general deterrence required that criminal trials be less 
exercises in ascertainment of the “material truth” of the charges, than vehicles to 
educate the populace in how properly to behave in the socialist community and 
be a productive member thereof. Thus, we have the great “show trials” conducted 
against the Old Bolsheviks or other “enemies of the people” of dangerous stature, 
and smaller “demonstration” trials conducted in factories, worker’s collectives, col-
lective farms, etc. To ensure the trial’s educational value, however, the state had to 
fix the result of the trial at the outset.
As was stated in § 3 of the Principles of Court Organization (1938):
In applying criminal measures, the court punishes not only the criminals, but aims also at 
their correction and reeducation. Through its total activity the court educates the citizens 
of the USSR in the spirit of dedication to the homeland and to socialism, in the spirit of 
an exact and strict fulfillment of Soviet laws, a careful attitude toward socialist property, 
to labor discipline, an honest approach to state and social duty, and to heeding the rules of 
socialist community.
Since the purpose of trials was predominantly education of the public and repres-
sion of “socially dangerous” people, rather than the ascertainment of truth, Soviet 
law rejected “bourgeois” concepts such as the presumption of innocence, the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, the right to counsel, and, in practice, even the pos-
sibility of acquittal.
This Soviet criminal justice system was adopted in most part by Poland, Hungary, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, and Romania after World War II. 
Although all these countries quickly “de-Sovietized” after the “velvet” revolutions 
of 1989. Soviet criminal law (and procedure) begin to “wither away” however, to be 
replaced by more conventional democratic rule of law forms with the ascendancy of 
Mikhail Gorbachev (b. 1931) to the post of General Secretary of the CPUSSR in 1985 
and his “restructuring” or perestroika of Soviet society, until the Soviet state itself 
withered away in December 1991.
After the Cultural Revolution and the death of Mao Zedong, a turn to “socialist 
legality” finally began in China under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping (1904–1997) 
as the country, while maintaining the Communist Party dictatorship in the political 
7 Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Criminal Justice Under Stalin (1996), 371.
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realms, gradually began moving to a market economy. The first Penal Code and 
Code of Criminal Procedure were finally enacted in 1979.
iii. General Principles of Soviet 
Criminal Law (The General Part)
1. Introduction
In this section I  will discuss the general principles of Soviet criminal law which 
distinguish it from Western criminal law systems, whether of civil law or common 
law heritage. Tsarist Russia was clearly in the civil law realm and today’s Russian 
Federation, though firmly back in civil law tradition, has, like many other coun-
tries reforming their criminal justice systems, moved closer to the common law in 
adopting adversarial procedure, plea bargaining, and, in Russia’s case, a reintroduc-
tion of jury trial. I will, however, note where Soviet principles continue to play a role 
in Russian criminal law today.
As I discuss Soviet criminal law legislation and practice from 1917 through 1991 
I will trace the rise and fall of principles that derive from utopian Marxist thought, 
the crude strains of enemy criminal law, or the instrumentalist Stalinist “social-
ist rule of law.” In the last analysis, it is the amalgam of these three ideological 
approaches that constitutes “Soviet criminal law.”
The death penalty, not only for murder (as in the United States) but for a wide 
swath of crimes against the socialist state and way of life, was also a part of social-
ist criminal law. Although most Western European countries had abolished the 
death penalty by the early 1980s, every socialist country maintained it until the 
German Democratic Republic abolished it in 1987, with the rest of the Southern 
and Eastern European members of the socialist bloc following suit after 1989, and 
most of the post-Soviet republics falling into line in the last 20 years. The remain-
ing socialist countries—North Korea, China, Vietnam, and Cuba—all still use the 
death penalty.
Throughout this section, and the following section dealing with the Special 
Part, I will refer, primarily, to the following important pieces of legislation: (a) the 
Guiding Principles of the Criminal Law of the Russian Soviet Federated Soviet 
Republic (RSFSR) of 1919 (Principles (1919));8 (b) the Criminal Code of the RSFSR 
8 Decree of the People’s Commissariat of Justice, Dec. 12, 1919, SU (1919), No. 66, item 590.
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of 1922 (CC (1922));9 (c) the Principles for Criminal Law Legislation of the USSR 
and Union Republics of 1924 (Principles (1924));10 (d)  the Criminal Code of the 
RSFSR of 1926 (CC (1926));11 (e) the Principles of Criminal Law Legislation of the 
USSR of 1958 (Principles (1958));12 and (f) the Criminal Code of the RSFSR of 1960 
(CC (1960)).13
However, the aforementioned codes, were supplemented, especially during 
Stalin’s rule, by ad hoc laws, resolutions of the Supreme Court and other govern-
ment bodies, and even secret regulations issued by government or party organs. For 
Stalin, the codes were the “conduct rules” for educating the people and deterring 
crime, the secret directives were the “decision rules” for administering them.
2. Goals of the criminal law
The Principles (1919), consisting of only 27 paragraphs, constituted the first attempt 
to lay out a General Part of criminal law after two years without codes, with judges 
relying on “revolutionary consciousness” to suppress anti-regime forces.
§ 3 Principles (1919) pronounced that the task of Soviet criminal law was “to 
protect, through repression, the system of social relations which corresponds to 
the interests of the workers as the dominant class in the transition from capital-
ism to communism, the dictatorship of the proletariat.” Until the promulgation 
of the CC (1922), this task had to be accomplished without a Special Part of the 
CC, that is, without statutory offenses with clearly delineated elements. This goal 
is clearly instrumental or utilitarian and reflects the Marxist notion that “law” 
will still be necessary during the transitional dictatorship of the proletariat. 
Criminal law will be needed for class purposes, thus also encompassing its use 
as enemy criminal law.
In later formulations, the mention of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” disap-
pears, with the goal of the criminal law being the protection of: the “government 
of the workers” from “crimes and socially dangerous elements” (§ 5 CC (1922)); 
or of the “socialist state of workers and peasants” against “socially dangerous acts 
(crimes)” (§ 1 CC (1926)). Finally, in post-Stalinist legislation, the goal becomes the 
protection of the “Soviet social and state structure, socialist property, the individual 
and rights of the citizen, and the entire socialist legal order” against “criminal acts” 
(§ 1 Principles (1958); § 1 CC (1960)). The USSR has become a state of all the people, 
9 SU (1922), No. 15, item 153. 10 SZ (1924), No. 24, items 205 and 206.
11 SZ (1926), No. 80, item 600.   12 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR (1959), No. 1, item 6.
13 Vedomosti Verkhovnogo Soveta RSFSR (1960), No. 40, item 591. Criminal codes were within 
the competence of the Soviet republics and the criminal codes of the RSFSR, by far the largest and 
most influential Soviet republic, will be my reference point. The “Principles,” on the contrary, were 
Union-wide in their application.
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not just workers and peasants, and with no hint of transitoriness. Enemy criminal 
law and Marxist utopianism have faded.
3. Judicial discretion in the Soviet definition of crime
Even with the promulgation of the first criminal code (CC (1922)), the imprint of 
the utopian “anti-law” period was still apparent. It set forth two principles which 
rendered the definition of crime incredibly malleable:  judicial discretion (in the 
form of “revolutionary conscience” or “socialist legal consciousness”), and the use 
of analogy.
a) Judging according to “revolutionary conscience” 
or “socialist legal consciousness”
Even before the Principles (1919), Decree No. 1 on the Courts, provided that “local 
courts will only be guided in their decisions and judgments by the laws of the old 
government to the extent that they have not been eliminated by the revolution and 
do not contradict revolutionary conscience and revolutionary legal consciousness.” 
Decree No. 2 on the Courts of March 7, 1918, bound local courts to apply “socialist” 
legal consciousness and informal justice principles. § 9 CC (1922) instructed judges 
to sentence according to their “socialist legal consciousness” while “observing the 
guiding principles and articles” of the Code.
b) Analogy
The ability to condemn someone after they have committed a dangerous act not 
rendered punishable by the Code is a version of convicting based solely on “revolu-
tionary conscience.” It violates the principles of legality and nulla crimen sine lege.
Punishment by analogy was allowed by § 10 CC (1922) and § 16 CC (1926), though 
it was seldom used. Crimes were vaguely defined in order to give state organs maxi-
mum flexibility in apprehending and convicting “enemies of the people.” The effect 
of the doctrine of analogy was to widen the already wide definition of political 
crimes listed in § 58 CC (1926) (see Section IV.2.b).
The legitimacy of the use of analogy and “revolutionary conscience” was eventu-
ally called into question by Soviet legal theorists, the most prominent of whom was 
Mikhail S. Strogovich (1894–1984). Writing in the 1940s and 1950s, he demanded 
that courts should punish only criminal acts included in the Code, and not status 
or class affiliation, and should seek to ascertain the truth of such charges and given 
written reasons based on evidence presented in court. His ideological opponent was 
Vyshinsky, who thought material truth could not be reached and that socialist legal 
consciousness was needed to correct the law to achieve political aims.
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Poland, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary never introduced analogy 
though they did, by and large, adopt the Soviet system of criminal law after World 
War II. Nulla crimen sine lege was finally recognized, and analogy eliminated, in the 
CC (1960).
Analogy and “revolutionary conscience” also played an important role in the 
early decades of the People’s Republic of China and unified Vietnam. Analogy was 
only eliminated in 1985 in Vietnam and 1997 in China.
4. Actus reus and social dangerousness
§ 6 Principles (1919) described a crime not as the violation of a formal normative 
prohibition, but as an “act or omission dangerous for the given system of social 
relations,” implying that the definition of crime may fluctuate with changes in the 
country’s social relations. This sociological, rather than psychological, approach 
paved the way for the instrumental use of criminal law not only to crush the 
regime’s perceived enemies, but also to facilitate the industrialization of Soviet 
society.
This material approach to criminal law was followed in all the Soviet codes 
and has even been maintained in the post-Soviet Criminal Code of the Russian 
Republic. § 6 CC (1926) also allowed for dismissal of de minimis crimes even though 
the elements of an offense were provable, if the act committed lacked the requisite 
social dangerousness and this provision remained part of Soviet and later Russian 
law. § 8 CC (1926) also provided for dismissal if the actor or the crime was no longer 
considered to be socially dangerous at the time of trial. The same applied in § 43(1) 
Principles (1958) and § 50 CC (1960).
The Principles (1919) require an “act or omission,” but this restriction became 
foggy over the years as enemy criminal law required the punishment of people due 
to their status. The goal of the criminal law to protect against “socially dangerous 
elements” (§ 5 CC (1922)) intimates that a voluntary act or omission may not have 
been a prerequisite for imposing sanctions. Persons considered dangerous due to 
their past criminal conduct or association with a criminal milieu could be subject to 
punitive measures (§ 7 CC (1926)), including banishment or restrictions on where 
they could live (§ 49 CC (1922); § 22 Principles (1924)). Acquitted persons could also 
be subject to the sanction of a “warning” (43 CC (1926)).
However, the Supreme Court of the RSFSR in 1927 decided that one could not be 
banished or exiled based on status alone, without having committed a criminal act 
and the post-Stalinist § 3 Principles (1958), clearly require that: “Criminal respon-
sibility and punishment may be imposed only on a person, who is guilty of the 
commission of a criminal act, that is, intentionally or negligently commits a socially 
dangerous act that is provided in the criminal law.”
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The emphasis on social dangerousness, rather than the morally laden and indi-
vidualistic notion of personal guilt, is one of the most typical and lasting character-
istics of Soviet criminal law.
5. Mens rea
a) Intent and negligence (carelessness)
The early Soviet codes reflect the Marxist attempt to break from the concept of psy-
chological guilt and retributive punishment or “just deserts” and to move to a socio-
logical analysis of social dangerousness in objective terms. In many ways, this came 
close to a denial of the inner or mental element of crime, or mens rea. Soviet courts 
vacillated from imposing strict liability for harm caused to insisting on guilty intent.
Whether a crime was committed intentionally, knowingly, or negligently, was, 
according to § 12(v) Principles (1919), seen more as a factor in imposing punish-
ment, than an element of the offense committed. Thus, pursuant to § 11 CC (1922), 
to be “punished” one must have acted (a) intentionally, that is, foresaw the results 
of his acts and desired, or consciously allowed, them to take place or (b) acted care-
lessly, that is, foolishly thought he could prevent the results of his acts or negligently 
failed to foresee the deleterious results. In the CC (1926), however, renowned as the 
Code “without guilt or punishment”, § 10 requires one of the same mental states 
to “apply a measure of self-defense of a judicial-corrective character,” the Code’s 
paraphrase for “punishment.” Even in the many Special Part offenses where causing 
serious injury or death aggravates punishment, the actor must at least be “careless” 
with respect to the aggravating result to merit the enhanced punishment. The Soviet 
definitions of mental states—intentional, knowingly, or carelessly (neostorozhno) 
are borrowed directly from the terms used in most civil law countries and have not 
been affected by Marxist thought.14
b) Mental illness and diminished capacity
Those suffering from a chronic mental illness or a temporary psychic disturbance at 
the time of their act, or who suffered from mental disease at the time of judgment, 
could neither be punished under § 17 CC (1922) nor be subject to measures of social 
defense of a judicial–corrective character under § 11 CC (1926). They could, how-
ever, be subject to other “measures of social defense of a medical character.”
Nevertheless, alcoholic intoxication was never treated as a factor which could 
eliminate or mitigate guilt, or lead to a reduced punishment. Abuse of alcohol has 
long been endemic in Russian culture and been the cause of poor work habits, 
14 The same approach is still used in post-communist Russia. Stephen C. Thaman, “Russia,” in Kevin 
John Heller and Markus D. Dubber (eds.), The Handbook of Comparative Criminal Law (2011), 420–422.
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violence, and low life expectancy. Yet the taxes on alcohol, especially vodka, were 
a major source of revenue for the tsarist and Soviet regimes, and still are in today’s 
Russian Federation. Until 1969, drunkenness could aggravate punishment only if it 
enhanced the social dangerousness of an act yet, thereafter, drunkenness became a 
general aggravating factor in sentencing (§ 10 CC (1960)).
c) Treatment of children, juveniles
Pursuant to § 18 CC (1922), minors younger than 14 years when they committed the 
act cannot be punished, and those aged 14 or 15 can normally only be subject to med-
ical or pedagogical measures and not punishment. The same limits were originally 
included in the CC (1926). If children had to be punished, the punishment was dis-
counted by one-half for 14- and 15-year-olds and by one-third for 16- and 17-year-olds.
However, an edict of April 7, 1935, “On the Struggle against Juvenile Crime,” 
lowered the minimum age of criminal responsibility to 12 years for a short list of 
common crimes and made children face trial in the normal courts and made them 
subject to the same penalties as adults. Age-based discounts were abolished by edict 
on November 25, 1935. The juvenile commissions which handled juvenile cases were 
also abolished.
6. Inchoate crimes and accomplice liability
While the Soviet definition of what constitutes an “attempt” or “preparation” of a 
crime does not diverge from definitions found in the civil law world, all of the Soviet 
codes, due to the focus on social dangerousness, applied the same punishments as 
for a completed crime. However, if the actor renounced his or her criminal inten-
tions before the crime was committed, he or she could not be punished for prepar-
ation or attempt, but only where the acts already committed constituted a distinct 
criminal offense (§ 19 CC (1926); § 16 CC (1960)).
In relation to accomplice liability, Soviet law, which differentiated between executors 
(principals), instigators, and aiders and abettors, also did not allocate different sen-
tences based solely on the level or quality of the aid provided toward commission of the 
offense, but solely on the social dangerousness of the defendant, no matter which role 
he or she played in a crime’s commission (§§ 21–24 Principles (1919); § 18 CC (1926)).
7. The Soviet theory of punishment
a) The broad use of discretion in general
The first Bolshevik decrees in relation to punishment were vague and allowed great 
discretion. Examples are where the guilty person will “receive a severe punishment,” 
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will “get a punishment that corresponds to the gravity of the deed,” or “will be pun-
ished with the full toughness of the revolutionary law.”
According to § 7 Principles (1919), punishment was described as “measures of 
coercion through which the state power protects the given social relations against 
criminals.”
This “repression” was not seen as retribution in the name of justice, but mere 
“coercion.” § 10 Principles (1919) stated that “in selecting punishment, one must 
take into consideration, that criminality is caused in class society by the circum-
stances of social relations in which the perpetrator lives,” and that “punishment is 
not retribution for guilt, not penitence for guilt” but “as a protective measure, pun-
ishment should be goal-oriented and at the same time without pain, and should not 
impose on the perpetrator any unnecessary or superfluous suffering.”
Even with the CC (1922), the most important sentencing principle was judicial 
discretion. Most articles gave judges a broad choice of sanctions, a spectrum of 
terms of custody, and noncustodial options, as well as “compulsory work” to be 
chosen according to their “socialist legal consciousness.” Throughout Soviet history, 
judges could also sentence below the statutory minimum in exceptional cases and 
this discretion continues to exist in post-communist Russia.
Another use of judicial discretion was the power to dismiss a case with condi-
tions, similar to what is called “diversion” in the United States. In cases of minor 
crimes, the court could “liberate” the accused from criminal responsibility and 
refer the case either to a “comrades’ court,” a lay court often within a collective 
farm or workers’ collective, or to the custody of a person for the purpose of super-
vising the conduct of the accused and ensuring the fulfillment of non-criminal 
measures (§§ 51, 52 CC (1960)). These courts were used in the early years of the 
USSR and then reinstituted in 1959.
b) Class as an aggravating or mitigating circumstance
Crucial, for the two-lane class-based approach to sentencing was § 12(a,b) Principles 
(1919) which asks the judge to determine “if the act was committed by a person 
who belonged to the propertied class and was committed with the goal of restoring, 
maintaining or obtaining privileges bound with the private property owning class, 
or whether by a propertyless person motivated by hunger or necessity” or “in the 
interest of restoring to power the vanquished class.” § 31 (a,b,v) Principles (1924) 
contained similar language. § 32(b) Principles (1924) also made it a mitigating factor 
if the actor was a worker or working peasant. In the following section on the Special 
Part we will see how rich peasants (kulaks) were subjected to aggravated punish-
ments for theft, solely due to their class adherence.
The aggravating and mitigating circumstances based on class did not make it 
into either the CC (1922) or the CC (1926), however, and were criticized as being 
“vulgar Marxist” principles. Article 4 of the Soviet Constitution of 1936, dubbed the 
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“Stalin Constitution,” proclaimed that the “exploitation of man by man” had been 
abolished, that is, that classes no longer existed. As we shall see in the discussion of 
the Special Part, workers were actually subject to some of the most draconian pun-
ishments during Stalin’s forced industrialization of the country.
c) Other aggravating circumstances and mitigating circumstances
Other than the specific Soviet or “Marxist” aggravating circumstances related to 
class mentioned previously, Soviet law provided for aggravating circumstances that 
were very similar to those found in Western democratic penal codes. Soviet mitigat-
ing circumstances, other than those based on class, are also not dissimilar to those 
found in Western codes.
The mitigating circumstances of hunger and need, however, disappeared in the 
Principles (1958) and the CC (1960), supposedly due to the fact that need had been 
eliminated by that time!15
8. Soviet punishments and measures 
of social protection
a) Non-custodial punishments and measures 
of judicial–corrective character
Other than deprivation of liberty and the death penalty, § 33 CC (1922) provided 
for expulsion from the country (exile) for a term or forever, forced labor without 
imprisonment, probation (conditional punishment), confiscation of property, fines, 
loss of rights, professional prohibitions, public reproach, and restitution. Among 
the “measures of judicial–corrective character” in the CC (1926) were also “declar-
ation as an enemy of the workers,” loss of citizenship, and expulsion from the coun-
try (§ 20(a) CC (1926)), a larger gamut of internal exile and banishment provisions 
and “warnings” (§ 20(o) CC (1926)).
From the early 1920s to the beginning of World War II, it was likely that a person con-
victed of a crime would receive a lenient, usually noncustodial, sanction. 80% of those 
convicted in court in the early 1920s received a sentence of compulsory labor without 
deprivation of liberty which, per § 35 CC (1922), could last from a week to a year.
b) Deprivation of liberty
In the early Soviet years, deprivation of liberty was considered to be an exceptional 
punishment for workers, peasants, or other common people and only to be imposed 
as the ultima ratio. For the class enemy or enemy of the people, however, the typical 
15 Ulrike Schittenhelm, Strafe und Stanktionensystem im sowjetischen Recht (1994), 215.
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punishment was deprivation of liberty, or death penalty by shooting. Since jail sen-
tences were considered to go against the preventive goal of rehabilitation, a mini-
mum sentence of six months was first set in the CC (1922), but was reduced to one 
month in 1923, seven days in 1924, and one day in the CC (1926), only to be raised to 
three months again in § 24 CC (1960). The reason for these short prison sentences 
was that neither fines, forced labor without confinement, nor suspended sentences 
were realistic alternatives in the early Soviet era.16
The percentage of sentences to deprivation of liberty gradually rose because there 
were insufficient work opportunities for a sentence to compulsory labor without 
confinement. By 1926, 40% received terms in prison, usually only for a number of 
months, up from around 20% in previous years, though the rate fell to around 9.6% 
in 1928 and 1929. However, with the Law of August 7, 1932 (see Section IV.3), rates of 
imprisonment jumped to 29% in 1933 and up to 67% in 1941, with the average terms 
being considerably longer.17
The USSR never had a punishment of life imprisonment because prisoners were 
always considered to be subject to rehabilitation. The longest prison sentence was 
originally ten years (§ 18 Principles (1919); § 34 CC (1922); § 28 CC (1926)), though 
the maximum was raised to 25 years in 1937 for some political crimes, but in § 23 
Principles (1958) the maximum was again lowered to ten years for normal crimes, 
and 15 years for especially dangerous recidivists and those convicted of especially 
grave crimes, such as aggravated murder. Vietnam, unlike the USSR and most other 
socialist regimes, did provide in general for longer prison sentences and life impris-
onment for murder and other serious crimes.
In the mature Soviet system there were three basic types of deprivation of lib-
erty: (a) settlement colonies, more like half-way houses, where low-level prisoners 
could work, live with their families, and leave for schooling; (b) corrective labor 
colonies, for higher security prisoners; and (c) prison (tiur’ma), since 1936 for dan-
gerous recidivists sentenced to more than five years for grave crimes.
Solzhenitsyn maintained that the system of Soviet concentration camps was 
first conceived by Lenin in the decree, “Temporary Instructions on Deprivation 
of Freedom,” of July 23, 1918. In a letter of August 1918, Lenin expressed his posi-
tion: “Lock up all the doubtful ones in a concentration camp outside the city” and 
“carry out merciless mass terror.” Solzhenitsyn claimed that this was the first time 
the term “concentration camp” was used in relation to one’s own citizens.18
Soviet law always allowed early release from prison after having served a set 
percentage of the sentence. In the last variant (§§ 44, 44-1 Principles (1958); §§ 53, 
53-1 CC (1960)), the condition for release was that “the actor has shown his correc-
tion through exemplary conduct and an honest approach to work.” Here one again 
sees the Soviet emphasis on rehabilitating prisoners to play a role in the country’s 
16 Schittenhelm (n. 15) 63, 90, 113. 17 Solomon (n. 7) 52, 223–224, 229.
18 Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, Gulag Archipelago, Vol. 2 (1979), 14–21.
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economy, although those sentenced to corrective labor colonies—the GULAG—
actually were the primary workforce in the industrialization of the USSR.
Laogai, or “reform through labor” which was aimed at transforming criminals 
into productive citizens, was the main sanction imposed in the People’s Republic 
of China for convicted criminals, or those just administratively detained. Although 
re-education was the main goal of criminal justice in China, in 1956 Mao stated that 
some counterrevolutionaries had to be killed: “because they were deeply hated by 
the masses and owed the masses heavy blood-debts.” From 1952 to 1962, around ten 
million prisoners died in Chinese re-education and prison camps from malnutri-
tion, being worked to death, or from execution.
Even after the 1997 reforms in China, minor offenders could still be adminis-
tratively committed to terms of “re-education through labor” of up to four years 
without even invoking the protections of the criminal justice system.
Socialist North Vietnam also had a broad system of “re-education” camps. 
Decrees in 1961 permitted unlimited detention in three-year renewable periods for 
the re-education of “counterrevolutionary elements” who threatened public secur-
ity, among them “professional scoundrels,” defined as persons who earned a liv-
ing by criminal means, such as thieves, pimps, and recalcitrant hooligans who had 
“refused to mend their ways” after being subjected to re-education measures not 
involving incarceration. Similar measures were applied to South Vietnamese col-
laborators with the U.S.-supported regime after the North’s victory in 1975.
c) Banishment, exile, restrictions on residence
Expulsion from the country or republic (vysylka) or internal banishment or exile 
(ssylka) in places like Siberia has a long tradition in Russia. § 36(a) CC (1922) and 
§ 20(e) CC (1926) provided for a punishment or sanction of “expulsion from the 
USSR for a term or forever.” § 20(zh) CC (1926) included a measure for internal 
exile (i.e. in Siberia).
The maximum length of banishment was originally 15 years but was eventually 
reduced to ten. Banishment and exclusion from a place could be imposed as the 
main, or as a supplementary, punishment. These punishments remained on the 
books until perestroika.
d) The death penalty
Russia has always had an ambivalent attitude toward the death penalty. Empress 
Elizabeth, for instance, abolished it in 1753 but it kept coming back until it was abol-
ished by the interim government of Alexander Kerensky after the overthrow of the 
tsar in February 1917. Although the Bolsheviks suspended the death penalty shortly 
after their seizure of power, it was reintroduced on June 16, 1918, to be used by the 
revolutionary tribunals and the CHEKA during the “red terror” of the years of “war 
communism.” Lenin claimed that “no one can be revolutionary and repudiate the 
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death penalty.” § 9 Principles (1919) provided:  “The protection of society against 
future criminal acts of someone who is subject to punishment can be achieved 
either through his adjustment to the given social order or, when the perpetrator 
does not adjust, through isolation and in exceptional cases through physical exter-
mination.” Although the death penalty was again abolished by decree after the end 
of the Civil War in January 1920, it was reauthorized five months later.
§ 33 CC (1922) and § 21 CC (1926) foresaw death by shooting, “until its repeal,” as 
the punishment for the most serious crimes which threatened the foundations of 
the Soviet state. The CC (1960), at its most repressive, provided for the death pen-
alty, “until its repeal” for 17 different offenses, including some economic offenses. 
Executions reached a high of 2,000 a year in the 1960s then dropped to 1,000 per 
year from the early 1970s to the mid-1980s. The death penalty is still on the books 
in the Russian Federation but there has been a moratorium on executions since 
1996 due to Russia’s ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights.
One official estimate was that 9,641 persons were executed following court trial 
from December 1917 through February 1922, the period of “war communism,” but 
others put the figure at from 25,000 to 150,000. Of course, the numbers executed 
by the CHEKA and other administrative organs was much greater. The number of 
executions following court verdicts during Stalin’s reign is estimated at somewhere 
between 700,000 and 800,000. It has also been estimated that from 1960 to 1981 
2,000 to 3,000 persons were executed each year, with the number falling to around 
750 a year from 1982 through 1989.
In the early 1950s in China, 95% of all crimes carried the death penalty, life impris-
onment, or imprisonment for a term. An estimated four million arrests were made by 
popular tribunals and around one-quarter of those arrested were executed. The death 
penalty was carried out immediately, usually in public, with a bullet in the nape of the 
neck. The Criminal Code of China of 1997 still has 68 crimes which are punishable 
by death, 20 of which are economic offenses, such as bribery or embezzlement, which 
can end in the death penalty if the loss amounts to more than 100,000 RMB ($14,500).
iv. The Special Part of Soviet  
Criminal Law
. Introduction
The really distinctive aspect of the Special Part of Soviet law is to be seen in three 
areas: counterrevolutionary crimes (always the first to be mentioned in the Special 
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Part), or crimes against the Soviet way of life, economic crimes (including theft of 
state property), and crimes by officialdom. Otherwise, crimes against the person 
such as murder, assault, sexual assault, etc., will only be mentioned in passing where 
pertinent.19
2. Counterrevolutionary crimes and crimes against 
the Soviet state and way of life
a) Introduction
Since all states punish high treason and other crimes against state power or the 
constitution, it is important to distinguish those provisions of Soviet law which go 
beyond the norm and are framed in vague terms which permit “flexible” application 
to dissidents or non-conformists of diverse stripes. Typically Soviet, in this context, 
is the threatened punishment of all adult members of the family of someone who is 
guilty of treason with loss of civil rights or being exiled to Siberia or other outlying 
regions for up to five years (§ 58(1v) CC (1926)).
b) Counterrevolutionary crimes and anti-Soviet agitation
§ 57 CC (1922) described “counterrevolutionary acts” as not only those aimed at 
overthrowing Soviet power and the Soviet state, but also acts which are “aimed at 
helping that part of the international bourgeoisie which does not recognize the equal 
rights of the communist system of property which has arrived to replace capitalism, 
and strives to overthrow it through interventions or blockades, espionage, financ-
ing of the press or other similar means.” §§ 60, 61 CC (1922) provide for a possible 
death penalty for anyone participating in such acts, or aiding organizations which 
“help the international bourgeoisie.” § 58(1,4) CC (1926) contains similar language.
§§ 69, 70 CC (1922) punished “propaganda and agitation” whether to “overthrow 
the Soviet power” or for “helping the international bourgeoisie.” § 72 CC (1922) 
punished the “preparation, possession with intent to distribute, and distribution of 
agitational literature of a counterrevolutionary character” and § 73 punished “con-
ceiving and distribution of untrue rumors or unproven information with counter-
revolutionary goals, which could give rise to social panic, or lack of trust in the 
government.”
The infamous § 58(10) CC (1926), which was in force throughout Stalin’s reign, 
contained similar language, and provided for the “highest form of social defense,” 
that is, the death penalty, if the propaganda, agitation, or literature contained reli-
gious or nationalistic content or the acts were committed during times of war or 
19 On the modern Russian approach to crimes against the person and sexual assault, which is similar 
to the approach in Soviet times, see Thaman (n. 14) 435–440.
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emergency. Solzhenitsyn gave examples of conduct that led to punishment under 
§ 58(10) CC (1926): putting a noose around a bust of Stalin better to carry it (ten years), 
a shepherd calling a cow a “collective-farm whore,” a deaf and dumb carpenter hang-
ing his coat on a bust of Lenin (ten years), drinking heavily because of hatred of the 
Soviet government (eight years); praying in church for the death of Stalin (25 years), 
or saying Pushkin was a better poet than the Soviet icon Mayakovsky (15 years).20
Anti-Soviet agitation continued to be punished by § 70 CC-RSFSR (1960), 
although no longer with the death penalty.
The crime of “undermining state industry, transport, commerce, or the monetary or 
credit system, or using state enterprises with counterrevolutionary intent,” sometimes 
called “wrecking” was also punishable by death (§ 58(7) CC (1926)), though a similar 
offense in post-Stalinist times was no longer punishable by death (§ 69 CC (1960)).
Up until the late 1970s, the 21 Articles of China’s “Statute on Punishment for 
Counterrevolutionary Activity” of February 20, 1951 was the closest thing to a 
criminal code. “Counterrevolutionary” was defined as “any activity that aims at 
overthrowing or undermining the democratic dictatorship of the people and the 
socialist system and therefore puts the People’s Republic of China in harm’s way.”
Like other socialist penal codes, the CC-Vietnam (1985) penalized a wide range of 
conduct as crimes against the state, which included “propaganda against the social-
ist regime,” or “production, possession, or distribution of documents or cultural 
articles whose content is directed against the socialist system.”
In 1999, Cuba passed a law in response to a drastic tightening of the U.S. trade 
embargo, which punishes by up to 20 years any “actions designed to support, facili-
tate, or collaborate with the objectives” of the embargo and the “economic war” 
against Cuba, which can include possessing, distributing, or reproducing “material 
with a subversive character” from a foreign government or collaborating with for-
eign media that “destabilizes the country and destroys the socialist state.”
c) Crimes against the socialist way of life
Parasitism
Adults could be punished as “parasites” if they lived off income not based on their own 
work and actually refused to do socially necessary labor per § 209 CC-RSFSR (1960). 
These specific laws were first introduced in 1957. A first violation could lead to a warn-
ing, but further violations could trigger banishment from one’s place of residence with 
a duty to work from two to five years. This punishment was administrative and issued 
by local committees or village Soviets and could not be appealed to the courts.21
In 1970, along with § 209 CC (1960) which punished begging and vagrancy, 
§ 209-1 CC (1960) was introduced which criminalized stubborn refusal to engage in 
socially useful labor. It was punished by deprivation of liberty of up to one year, and 
20 Solzhenitsyn (n. 18) 279–281.   21 Schittenhelm (n. 15) 222–223.
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up to two years for repeat offenders. In 1975, § 209-1 CC (1960) was repealed, and 
parasitism was incorporated into § 209 CC (1960) as the crime of living a “long-term 
parasitic lifestyle,” defined as gaining one’s livelihood from illegal sources, such as 
prostitution, speculation, gambling, fortune-telling, begging, profits from renting 
one’s house or car, etc. Dissidents, such as the poet Joseph Brodsky (1940–1996) 
were sentenced under these provisions.22
Cuba has criminalized the failure to work, which can result in a sentence of up 
to two years of forced labor. Gays and lesbians were also punished with up to four 
years’ forced labor for “dangerousness” (peligrosidad), defined as “having a special 
proclivity to commit crimes, demonstrated by behavior that clearly contradicts 
socialist norms.” Homosexuality was considered to be deviant, against socialist 
morality, and even “counterrevolutionary.”
Hooliganism
The crime of “hooliganism” takes its name from the drunken exploits of Irish seamen 
and became a peculiarly Soviet-Russian crime. Khuliganstvo originally began as an 
offense aimed at drunk or disorderly conduct which disturbed the peace. It normally 
involved rowdy conduct that escalated into personal injury or property destruction 
and nearly all those prosecuted were intoxicated at the time of the offense.
In the CC (1922) hooliganism was characterized as a crime against “life, health 
and dignity.” Hooliganism was originally tried in the village or comrades’ courts 
and most sentences were to forced labor without confinement or very short jail 
sentences.23
Traditionally, “hooliganism” was described as “gross mischief and drunken bold-
ness, and striving in an acute way to show one’s power and strength, a desire to 
show disdain to those around one, to draw attention to oneself with one’s cynical 
behavior.” In the last Soviet code, “hooliganism” was described as “intentional acts 
which grossly violate social order and express a clear disrespect for society.” An 
aggravated form, “malicious hooliganism,” applied to those with prior hooliganism 
convictions, those who acted against representatives of the state or social organiza-
tions, or whose conduct “distinguishes itself by its unmistakable cynicism or auda-
city” (§ 206 CC (1960)).
An edict of August 10, 1940, aimed at hooliganism and theft in factories, led to 
the amendment of § 74 CC (1926) and the setting of a five-year maximum for aggra-
vated hooliganism in the workplace. During the campaign triggered by the edict, 
nearly all those convicted of hooliganism received a term of imprisonment.24
When the death penalty was introduced for aggravated murder, “hooliganistic 
motivation” became one of the aggravating factors (§ 102(b) CC (1960)).25
22 Schittenhelm (n. 15) 255–256.   23 Solomon (n. 7) 58, 132–133.
24 Solomon (n. 7) 331–332.
25 On “hooliganism” in modern Russian law, Thaman (n. 14) 448–449.
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3. Crimes against property: the priority of socialist 
property over private property
The definition of theft in Soviet law followed tsarist law and distinguished between 
“secret” (krazha) and “open” takings (grabezh).26 Characteristic of Soviet law, how-
ever, is the distinction made between crimes against private and socialist property.
In the USSR, due to replacement of private ownership of the means of produc-
tion by state ownership, crimes against state property were punished more severely 
than crimes against private property. Crimes against state property were really “eco-
nomic” crimes, and indirect crimes against the state.
Thus, § 79 CC (1926) punished non-aggravated destroying or damaging of prop-
erty of government agencies or enterprises by deprivation of liberty of up to one 
year, whereas the same act against private property was punishable by only up to 
six months’ deprivation of liberty (§ 175 CC (1926)). Theft of private property was 
punishable by up to three months’ deprivation of liberty but theft of state property 
could be punished by up to five years’ deprivation of liberty (§ 162(a,d,e) CC (1926)). 
The original version of the CC-RSFSR (1960) continued this differentiation between 
crimes against socialist property and private property.
Criminal law was used as an instrument by Stalin in his drive to collectivize agri-
culture and force rapid industrialization. In 1930, it became a crime to kill your 
own cattle, pregnant livestock, or stock of breeding age. In March 1931, “spoiling 
a tractor” became a criminal offense (§§ 79-1, 79-4 CC (1926), as amended). Most 
notorious, however, was the law of August 7, 1932, written by Stalin himself, which 
preempted the provisions in the CC (1926) and referred to socialist property as 
“holy and untouchable” and provided for the death penalty, or, in mitigated situ-
ations, for ten years’ deprivation of liberty, for anyone who stole from state enter-
prises, collective farms, or cooperatives, including theft of harvest or livestock. The 
bulk of the prosecutions were against peasants for stealing grain during the cata-
strophic famine unleashed by the forced collectivization.27
Although the law of August 7 fell into disuse after collectivization, after World 
War II Stalin returned to draconian punishments for theft in a decree of June 4, 
1947, which raised the minimum punishment for simple theft of personal property 
from five to six years, and that for aggravated theft from seven to ten years. For sim-
ple theft of state property, the minimum was raised from six to seven years with a 
maximum for repeat offenses of 25 years. Under pressure from Stalin, the Supreme 
Court of the USSR issued a directive in 1952 which prevented judges from sentenc-
ing below the minimum.28
After Stalin’s death, first-time petty theft was decriminalized, but the draconian 
sentences for theft otherwise survived until enactment of the CC (1960). Stalin’s 
26 On crimes against property in modern Russia, Thaman (n. 14) 440–443.
27 Schittenhelm (n. 15) 160.   28 Solomon (n. 7) 440.
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“strike-hard” campaign against theft by workers in industrial and agricultural 
enterprises is perhaps the best example of the move from Marxist to instrumen-
tal criminal law. During the early Marxist period, the worker was the carrier of 
the revolution and the bourgeois elements were the class enemy. Under Stalin, the 
worker and peasant became the new serfs of an economy based on slave labor and, 
in a sense, became the class enemy of the owners of the means of production, the 
Communist Party.29
4. Economic crimes
a) Criminalization of entrepreneurial activity
After the Russian Revolution, the act of “buying and selling to make a profit” was 
immediately criminalized, though this provision was eliminated during NEP in 
favor of anti-monopoly or price-fixing laws. §§ 99, 99-1 CC (1926) punished by up 
to two years the acquisition of products or fish with the intent of selling them for 
profit. § 107 CC (1926) punished sale of agricultural products for profit. After NEP, 
however, Soviet codes provided for criminal punishment for entrepreneurial activ-
ity up until perestroika. See § 153 CC-RSFSR (1960).
b) Criminalization of common labor infractions
During the Civil War the Bolsheviks used military conscription to recruit labor for 
their enterprises and missing or leaving work subjected conscripted workers to a 
criminal charge of “labor desertion” under the CC (1922). This was dropped in the 
CC (1926).30
In preparation for war, Stalin issued an edict on June 26, 1940, which criminalized 
common labor infractions, such as quitting and shirking, and raised to new levels 
punishments for hooliganism, petty theft at factories, and production of defective 
goods. Such offenses were responsible for more than two-thirds of all criminal 
convictions in 1940, more than one-half in 1945, and over 40% even in 1949. Any 
employee of a state firm who quit a regular job without permission was subject to 
a term of imprisonment of two to four months. The edict also prohibited the firing 
of workers who shirked. Any shirker who missed all or part of a day at work faced a 
punishment of one to six months’ corrective work with a deduction from earnings of 
up to 25%. To prevent workers from stealing something small from their factory in 
order to get fired so that they could find better work, a decree was issued on August 
10, 1940, imposing a mandatory one-year prison sentence for petty theft at factories. 
29 e.g. the majority of workers who built the mammoth Moscow–Volga canal between Sept. 14, 
1932 and Jan. 31, 1938, were prisoners sentenced to corrective labor camps for property and economic 
crimes, among other things. 22,842 of them died during its construction. Karl Schlögel, Terror und 
Traum. Moskau 1937 (2nd ed., 2011), 374. 30 Solomon (n. 7) 305.
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Even though judges were reluctant to convict for these offenses, convictions for vio-
lations of the edict, mainly for shirking, amounted to 51.1% of all convictions from 
1943 through 1945.31
The law punishing violation of a labor contract or arriving late at work was elimin-
ated in 1956.
5. Crimes against public administration
Crimes against public administration, like “anti-soviet” activity, were sufficiently 
vague to be used in an instrumental way to punish those whose conduct impeded 
Soviet industrialization. The most common offense was § 61 CC (1926), “refusal 
to fulfill a duty, universal governmental task, or industrial labor having universal 
governmental importance” which was punishable by a fine, or on a second viola-
tion by deprivation of liberty or forced labor for up to one year, or if committed 
by a “kulak” element or in an aggravated manner, by up to two years’ deprivation 
of liberty. During collectivization of agriculture, § 61 was used to punish peas-
ants who hoarded grain, thus forcing them to dissolve their farms and flee the 
countryside.32
The poor functioning of the Soviet economy, and the mistakes and accidents 
caused by break-neck industrialization, led Stalin and other high government offi-
cials to find scapegoats for these shortcomings. This use of the criminal law against 
scapegoats was a distinctive aspect of Stalin’s use of the criminal law. Individuals 
could be held criminally responsible not only for actions performed, but for omis-
sions, accidents, or failures that were not intentional and not even the fault of the 
accused.33
Government officials prosecuted as “scapegoats” were originally charged with 
“abuse of power or official position” (§ 109 CC (1926)) in the case of intentional 
violations and under § 111 CC (1926), in the case of negligent failure to fulfill 
official duties. Violations of § 109 were punishable by a minimum of six months’ 
deprivation of liberty, and of §111 by a maximum of three years’ deprivation of 
liberty. But Vyshinskiy urged legal officials to charge wrecking (§ 58(7) CC (1926)) 
and counterrevolutionary sabotage (§ 58(14) CC (1926)) in all industrial failings. 
In 1937, when some products were found to be infected with ticks, Vyshinskiy 
declared this the work of wreckers and insisted on the death penalty for all con-
victed. In 1937 and 1938, many, if not most, cases involving accidents, defective 
goods, broken machines, or other problems of the economy were escalated from 
their usual status of “criminal negligence” to the potentially capital crime of 
“wrecking.”34
31 Solomon (n. 7) 299–301, 311, 324.   32 Solomon (n. 7) 93.
33 Solomon (n. 7) 138–139.   34 Solomon (n. 7) 241–242.
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6. Crimes against the person
a) Homicide and sexual offenses
The formulations of homicide and sexual offenses in the CC (1922) and subsequent 
penal codes were taken over directly from the 1903 tsarist draft criminal code and 
reveal nothing peculiarly “Marxist” or “Soviet.”
If anything, there seems to be a peculiar lack of concern with homicide, when 
compared with other seemingly less serious “counterrevolutionary” or “anti-Soviet” 
offenses. No crime of homicide even existed until the CC (1922), as the decrees 
passed by the commissars were dedicated solely to counterrevolutionary activities. 
The maximum punishment for aggravated murder remained at ten years, until § 102 
CC (1960) for the first time provided for a possible death penalty. Due to the num-
ber of murders perpetrated by the Soviet authorities themselves, it is not surprising 
that homicide was not of particular concern to them.
b) Abortion
In 1920, Russia became the first country to legalize abortion, permitting free abor-
tions on request when performed by doctors in hospitals. Underground abortions 
remained criminal after 1920. The CC (1922) did, however, punish abortions per-
formed by anyone other than a doctor or in unsanitary conditions by up to one 
year’s imprisonment, and provided for mandatory imprisonment of up to five years 
for persons who performed abortions as a trade or caused the death of the woman.35
But on June 27, 1936 Stalin issued a decree banning all abortions other than to 
protect the health of the pregnant woman or prevent the birth of a child with an 
inherited disease. Doctors faced up to two years’ deprivation of liberty if they per-
formed abortions without a pressing medical need and self-aborting women were 
punished by censure and a small fine.36
The re-establishment of abortion as a crime is an example of Stalin’s use of crim-
inal law to implement social policy. Stalin sought to raise the birth rate and rem-
edy one of the negative consequences of his rule—the steady drop in births since 
1927 caused by collectivization, deportation of family members, and the need for 
women to enter the workforce. Their low wages meant it was difficult to support 
large families.37
The criminalization of abortion by Stalin was ineffective as women refused to 
turn in the illegal abortionists and the courts were also reluctant to impose the 
required prison sentences.38 In 1955, abortion became available in hospital and clin-
ics during the first 12 weeks of pregnancy.39
35 Solomon (n. 7) 214.   36 Solomon (n. 7) 211, 216.
37 Solomon (n. 7) 212.   38 Solomon (n. 7) 221.
39 Schittenhelm (n. 15) 198.
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v. Conclusion: The Disappearance  
of Soviet Socialist Law?
In December 1991, the USSR ceased to exist and was replaced by 15 independent 
republics. All 15 republics embarked on courses of reform, including the promul-
gation of new constitutions and new criminal codes. Already in 1989, the former 
socialist countries of Eastern and Southern Europe had renounced socialism and 
many also passed new constitutions and codes. They quickly shed nearly all traces 
of Soviet socialist law, as did the ex-Soviet Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and 
Lithuania. Since most of these countries had essentially been colonized by the USSR 
and its law, it was easy for them to rid themselves of its worst aspects.
Although tendencies toward authoritarian rule are blemishing the democratic 
advances in some of the former Soviet republics, and democracy has completely 
failed to take root in most of the dynastic authoritarian former Soviet republics of 
Central Asia, all former Soviet republics, with the exception perhaps of Belarus, 
have “de-Sovietized” their criminal law. The different treatment of state and private 
property has by and large disappeared, and the death penalty has virtually disap-
peared from the post-Soviet landscape.
Russia, and many of the post-Soviet countries have, however, maintained the 
material definition of crime based on social dangerousness.
I stated earlier that “Marxist” notions of law could only with difficulty become the 
foundation of a country like the USSR or China, which had forced a socialist revolu-
tion in a country that had not benefited from capitalist development of the means 
of production. Thus these countries had to revert to what Marx called the “Asiatic 
mode of production,” that is, an economy based on slave labor. Soviet criminal law 
produced these slaves with its sentences to corrective labor colonies, and disciplined 
them when they were obliged to work in state enterprises or collective farms.
Today’s former Soviet republics are now going through a belated “bourgeois” 
revolution against the Soviet empire based on forced labor, which should eventually 
lead to the rejection of enemy criminal law and the instrumental use of criminal 
law for development purposes. China and Vietnam are carefully taking steps in this 
direction and Cuba may not be far behind. But North Korea? The only thing that 
might survive are some of the utopian, “liberal” aspects of early “Marxist” law.
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